The Dialectic of Apostasy Punishment and Freedom of Belief in Islamic Thought

Abdul-Aziz Al-Sawafi

Abstract

This article discusses the apparent contradiction between the openly declaring of apostasy and the criminal penalties that follow it, notably death, and the freedom of belief in Islamic thought. It questions how one can reconcile the assertion that Islam guarantees freedom of belief with the punitive measures for apostasy. It also raises the point that threatening a Muslim with death for changing their religion could be considered a form of coercion to accept Islam, thereby clearly infringing upon religious freedom, as recognized by the Holy Qur’an. In order to remove this alleged contradiction, we adopted a descriptive approach in defining the terms of the study, and the inductive and analytical approach in citing the guidelines conducive to defending the well-known opinion of the necessity of killing an openly fitri (one who was born into a Muslim family) apostate, and killing an unrepentant milli (one who converted to Islam by choice) apostate if they refuse to repent. We also employed a comparative approach to highlight the strengths, distinctions, and superiority of Islamic thought compared to other legislative systems. The study yielded several results, including: that Islamic thought guarantees realistic freedom of belief for individuals, and that there is a variety of valid justifications, even if some involve reconciling the necessity of punishment for an openly apostate with the freedom to choose one›s beliefs.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)