The Nature and Foundations of John Searle’s Theory of Institutional Facts

Muhammad Abdul-Latif Hamudah

Reza Azariyan

Abstract

The topic of conventionalism, or institutional facts holds a special importance in contemporary discussions in epistemology, as it falls opposite to true and real concepts within the human epistemic system, including both concepts and assents. John Searle, a contemporary Western philosopher, dedicated his studies on social realities, and has unique views in this regard. He divided realities existing in this world into two: natural realities and institutional facts. Searle believed that natural realities are realities that exist independently from the perceiver, like trees, valleys, etc. As for institutional facts, their existence relies on a type of perception by the perceiver, like money, ownership, leadership, and so on. Among the problems Searle faced was his attempt to include institutional facts in the external world, and within material things. This led him to contradictions, because what is external cannot depend on the perception of the perceiver. When he rejected the immaterial and metaphysical realm, he also fell into the problem of a person being coerced, or predestined, because he had to analyse perception as it being something biological, formed within the nerve system of the brain. His claim that institutional facts originate from language also led him to a vicious circle, because that language itself would need language. In this paper, we used the analytical critical methodology in studying the theory of social realities according to John Searle, aiming at understanding this theory and its scope of usage.

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